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Abstract

Violence has been a part of the LAC region’s landscape since before independence, evolving from interstate to
intrastate, and, more recently, emerging as criminal violence in the 1990s. Today LAC is the world’s most
violent region —home to seven of the ten cities registering the highest homicide rates. According to recent
polling, insecurity is one of citizens’ two top concerns. Guest editor Jose Miguel Cruz unites top scholars to
examine the complex problem from various disciplinary perspectives —history, sociology, political science,
journalism, communications and public policy —to identify the drivers and manifestations of violence in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
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T H E

E D I T O R

Dear Hemisphere readers:
With this issue of Hemisphere, guest-edited by José Miguel Cruz, Director of Research at the Kimberly Green
Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), we continue our work to understand the complex dynamics
of crime and insecurity in the Americas. Violence has been part of the region’s political landscape since before
independence; rather than interstate, however, much of the violence plaguing the region since the twentieth century
is intrastate, pitting state and non-state actors against each other with the goal of maintaining or seizing political
and socioeconomic power. As Dr. Cruz indicates, in the 1990s a different type of violence emerged in the region:
criminal violence, and it reached epidemic levels. Today, Latin America and the Caribbean is the world’s most
violent region, certainly in terms of homicide rates. Seven of the 10 cities with the highest levels of homicide rates
are in Latin America and the Caribbean, and citizens there feel the fears and suffer the costs of this insecurity on a
daily basis. According to recent polling by AmericasBarometer, insecurity is one of the top two concerns of citizens
in all countries of the region, even in low-crime countries such as Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay.
Any understanding of the dynamics of criminal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean requires a
multinational and interdisciplinary approach. Dr. Cruz has brought together an impressive collection of scholars
from across the region to examine this complex problem from various disciplinary perspectives-history, sociology,
political science, journalism, communications and public policy. In addition to offering compelling data, this issue
of Hemisphere provides a diverse set of essays that analyze the drivers and manifestations of violence, including
weak criminal justice systems, transnational criminal organizations, human and drug trafficking, vigilantism,
overcrowded prisons, gender-based violence and weakened economies.
LACC, a long-standing leader in the study of violence in the region, is committed to providing cutting-edge,
reliable and thought-provoking research on this complex and critical challenge to the stability, security and
prosperity of the region. Our expectation is that this issue of Hemisphere will provide a comprehensive examination
of the subject, add to scholarly and policy debates on crime and insecurity in the Americas, and offer academics and
policymakers alike new insights into the theoretical and practical challenges, as well as solutions.
Frank O. Mora
Director & Professor
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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FROM THE GUEST EDITOR
Twenty-five years ago, most Latin American countries were still emerging from the military dictatorships and
authoritarian regimes that had ravaged the region for years. In many of them, an expectation prevailed that a new era
of political stability, development and economic growth was about to begin. Several countries embarked on promising
reforms of their public apparatuses, including criminal justice systems and security forces. Civil society participation
flourished as electoral processes and formal democratic institutions became the norm, and many of the authoritarianera constraints imposed on civil and individual rights were shattered.
By the early 1990s, however, research by the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the PanAmerican Health Organization (PAHO) began reporting alarming rates of crime and interpersonal violence in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Countries such as Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Jamaica displayed what
PAHO described as epidemic levels of interpersonal violence, well above the world average. As the decade drew to a
close, these same organizations warned of the impact of criminal violence on the region’s development and the wellbeing of its citizens.
Fast-forward 25 years, and the region has been unable to shake off its problems with crime and insecurity. In some
countries, the situation has gotten much worse. In northern Central America, Venezuela and some parts of Mexico and
Brazil, criminal violence is so prevalent that it has provoked a humanitarian crisis, with street gangs, vigilante groups
and rogue armies assuming control and state-like responsibilities over entire communities and rural areas. At the same
time, some countries, such as Chile, Nicaragua and Uruguay, have managed to keep crime relatively under control,
and others previously besieged by high levels of crime—Colombia and Guatemala, for example—have enacted policies
that have succeeded in reducing violence over the last decade.
Many factors play a role in the dynamics of criminal violence in the region. Researchers have pointed to the
expansion of transnational criminal organizations, the war on drugs, the erosion of the welfare state, the rapid increase
of urbanization, the liberalization of political competition, and the peak of the youth bulge as some of the causes.
At this writing, more study and debate is needed to understand the full dimensions of crime and insecurity and their
impact on the Americas.
This issue of Hemisphere aims to contribute to the discussion on criminal violence in Latin America. It recruits
experts from around the region to examine the historical evolution of crime and insecurity, the role of criminal justice
systems, the participation of and consequences for young people, and the implications of the victimization of women.
The contributors also offer new insights into the role of Latin American elites in maintaining public security, the
“contribution” of the Brazilian security forces, the dynamics of organized crime along the US-Mexican border, and
representations of women as criminal actors. In addition, the editors have sought to provide a closer look at some of
the most conspicuous victims of crime and its perpetrators in the region. The photo essay for this issue, for example,
features stories of people affected by different manifestations of violence. The photos date from the early 2000s,
underscoring the chronic nature of violence in several countries of the region. This issue also presents excerpts of
interviews conducted with gang members in El Salvador in 2016 as part of an ongoing LACC research project.
By including this information, the editors hope to further the debate on crime and insecurity from the perspective not
only of the academic researchers who study these phenomena, but also the individuals who endure their consequences.
José Miguel Cruz
Director of Research
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
4
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The Multiple Faces of

Violence in Latin America
by Roberto Briceño-León

L

atin America is the
world’s most violent
region. According to
reports released over
the last decade by the
World Health Organization (WHO)
and The United Nations Drug and
Crime Office (UNODC), when
compared to other world regions,
crimes in Latin America tend to
be more violent, murder is
committed more frequently, and
the threat or use of physical force
is more common. Yet, the world’s
highest levels of poverty are not
found in Latin America; no major
racial, ethnic, or religious conflicts
are taking place there; and the
region is no longer suffering
significant political strife. There
are no wars, and Latin American
democracies, despite their issues,
are rather stable. Why then, is
Latin America so violent?
MULTIPLE CRIMINALITY
While having a drink sitting
in the local bar, a man turns to
his neighbor, takes out a gun and
shoots him. Startled, some people
run away, but one man remains and
asks:-What happened? The answer
is succinct:-He gave me a nasty
look, and I killed him…
This is how violence has played
out in Latin America for years, and
it is a common scenario frequently
repeated in jokes or remarks by
politicians, pundits and sociologists.
However, there is not just one
singular type of violence in Latin

America; crime in the region has
become extremely complex and
acts of violence, many and varied.
Homicides, assaults and casualties
occur daily in all countries, but
crime in Mexico and crime in
Argentina are not the same, nor
is the violence in neighboring
countries, such as Colombia and
Venezuela. One cannot compare
violence by guerrilla groups in the
Colombian jungle to violence by
Argentine military dictatorships,
and neither resembles the cruelty
exerted by the drug lords in Mexico
or the kingpins who control unit
sales of maconha in the favelas of
Rio de Janeiro. When it comes
to murder, the differences among
countries are not only substantial in
terms of numbers, but also in terms
of significance and political impact.
One can group violence in Latin
America into two distinct periods.
Before the 1990s, widespread
violence was linked to conflicts over
power; after the 1990s, violence
linked to extortion emerged. The
manifestations of violence changed
in the 1980s during the so-called
“Lost Decade,” which served as an
important transition period. During
that time, crime increased, and
violence became more urban than
rural, more criminal than political,
and more quotidian than sporadic.
The following pages analyze
the types of violence that came to
characterize each period and how
they changed over time. Some cities,
such as Medellín or São Paulo,
have managed to reduce homicide

and crime levels, while others,
such as Caracas or San Pedro Sula,
have faced dramatic increases. Rates
of change are also inconsistent
across the region. In some cases,
things have improved or worsened
in very short periods of time, while
in others, they have remained stable
or changed so gradually that the
shift has gone virtually unnoticed.
The discussion concludes with the
analysis of common denominators
among countries suffering extreme
violence and draws conclusions that
may help us review public policies of
prevention and crime control.
VIOLENCE BEFORE
THE 1990s
By the end of the last century,
three types of violence characterized
the region: violence by landowners;
violence by dictatorships; and
violence spawned by insurgents and
guerrillas. Linked to fights for power
and control over territory, violence
up to the 1990s mostly involved
struggles to establish social order
and authority and was also used
as a tool to maintain, reinforce or
undermine power.
Violence by large landowners
Violence in Latin America was,
for a long time, concentrated in
rural areas. A developed state did
not exist in many zones, nor did
a robust legal system that would
allow the resolution of conflicts
via independent courts of law.
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in
his classic novel, Facundo, posited
that the expansive rural areas of
the region, and those who lived
Hemisphere Volume 26
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Soldiers patrolling the street outside a children’s day-care facility in a gang-controlled neighborhood in Ilopango, El Salvador. August 31, 2015.
SALVADOR MELENDEZ

there, exemplified “barbarism.”
The only means to achieve progress
and further development required
that the inhabitants of those
regions be “tamed” and exposed to
“civilization;” namely, the city and
the law. As part of this rationale,
economic and political power had
to be exerted-and was done so, to
a large extent-by private armies
formed and controlled by large
landowners. In many cases, large
landowners served as predecessors
to a not yet consolidated state and
wielded their power by legitimizing
the use of force. This experience in
Latin America laid the foundation
for the future development of an
ever-changing landscape of violence.
8

Although expressions of
violence have varied across time,
commonalities do exist. Violence
inflicted at the hands of so-called
coroneles in the northeast of Brazil
shares characteristics with the many
stories of violence related to the
rise of paramilitary groups in the
Colombian Urabá (Antioquia) and
the murders of indigenous people
in Guatemala. In each case, violence
has been the result of the constant
struggle for control of land. Another
root cause is the failure of societies
to develop, provide and utilize
effective tools to ensure peaceful
resolution of conflicts and give
citizens the opportunity to
exercise their rights.

Violence by dictatorships
In Latin America, traditional
autocracies took it upon themselves
to “civilize” their countries and
modernize society with the creation
of a state that would control social
relations by law rather than by
force. The process also stressed
the need for a kind of “Caesar,” or
enlightened dictator, who, with
wisdom and an iron fist, would
guide, educate, and also subjugate
society. The outcomes of these
exercises have varied greatly.
Literary masterpieces such as El
Señor Presidente by Miguel Angel
Asturias, El otoño del patriarca by
Gabriel García Márquez, and La
fiesta del chivo by Mario Vargas Llosa
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provide compelling backdrops for
their portrayals of dictators who
have absolute control over society
and exercise power through extrajudicial violence.
In contrast, the relatively recent
Argentine, Chilean or Uruguayan
dictatorships formed in a new
environment, and for a different
purpose, in the confrontational
context of the Cold War.
The violence exerted by these
dictatorships was intended to
dominate the political opposition,
whose regime leaders were defined
not only as social enemies or rivals
for political power, but also as
foreign agents acting domestically.
In the end, the conflict was
ideological and political, and
merited an all-out “war” in the eyes
of the regimes. It was that belief that
led rulers to commit brutal acts of
violence and extreme violations of
human rights.
Another case of violence that
is rarely mentioned in the region,
perhaps due to a kind of convenient
self-censorship by Latin American
intellectuals and leftists, is the one
exercised for decades by Cuba.
The Cuban regime, dressed in
revolutionary garb and shouting
slogans of liberation, has used
violence against its political enemies,
accusing them of being counterrevolutionaries and foreign agents,
just as the Argentine and Chilean
dictatorships did in their time.
Violence by guerrillas
Responses to violence have been
equally violent. Peasant insurrection
emerged in rural societies in Latin
America, and the use of violence
was central to these movements.
These “agrarian” uprisings, which
occurred from Mexico to Chile,
have become mythologized, but
in fact, their results have been

mixed. This is also true of the
liberal guerrillas in Colombia who
launched the “Guerra del Llano” in
the 1950s. Using violence as a tool,
they managed to defeat the army
and impose their law in certain
territories, but they ultimately
failed to uphold their achievements.
Regardless, by the end of the
1950s, thanks to the victory of the
Cuban revolution, armed guerrilla
movements as a violent reaction
to oppressive government became
consolidated as a viable political
alternative in Latin America.
Starting in the 1960s, guerrilla
warfare, which sought to seize
political power by armed force,
became one of the most significant
expressions of violence in the region.
The political thesis was simple:
A group of courageous leaders
would begin their guerrilla war
in a hotbed of discontent, with
the intention of arousing support
among the local population to
expand their operation into a
political and military movement
and, ultimately, overthrow the
established authorities. The
characteristics of this expression
of violence were specific to each
country. The Venezuelan Armed
Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) were not the same
as Argentina’s Montoneros or
Uruguay’s Tupamaros. All of them,
however, were part of a broad
support initiative for the “antiimperialist war” that garnered
public attention following the TriContinental Conference held
in Havana in 1966.
The guerrilla cycle of violence
in the region has been winding
down due to the defeat of most of
the groups and their integration
into the mainstream political
arena. This is the case of the
Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path

in Peru, and Colombia’s FARC,
the oldest guerrilla organization
in Latin America, whose original
leaders simply died of old age. The
FARC’s new leadership eventually
acknowledged that its tactics
and methods were no longer
effective and recently put down
their weapons in a historic peace
agreement with the Colombian
government. Such agreements
by themselves do not mean that
the violence is over, but they do
represent a significant step forward.
As the Colombian novelist Héctor
Abad, whose father was murdered
by guerrillas, recently wrote, the
text of the Colombian peace accord
has a lot more poetry than the real
and practical prose of national
reconciliation. But it should also
be acknowledged that it was poetry
more than tactics that led to the
rise of guerrilla movements in the
region, and thus, it stands to reason
that a dose of poetry may also help
with the peacemaking.
VIOLENCE AFTER
THE 1990s
Over time, the drug business
became a primary source of income
for criminal groups. This, along
with the end of the Soviet Union
and the Cold War, led to the depoliticization of everyday life and
the rise of another kind of violence.
Drug violence
The drug market has become
one of the great drivers of crime
in the region. It is a vast market,
and its revenues and capacity to
reinvent itself and move in and out
of legal and illegal worlds make
the stakes very high. The violence
exercised by the drug cartels in
Colombia and Mexico to control
production zones or shipping routes
has taken unimaginable forms. In
the northern triangle of Central
America (El Salvador, Honduras,
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and Guatemala), violence has also
mutated dramatically due to drugs.
El Salvador, which for years bled out
from a war between the government
and guerrillas, was able to reach
a peace accord, putting an end to
long-held hostilities. However,
new opportunities created by the
drug trade revived crime, and old
combatants morphed into common
criminals who supported drug
shipping routes to Mexico and the
United States. In Colombia, the
drug business ensured a stable source
of income for the guerrillas, and it
was thanks to that money that they
were able to acquire sophisticated
weaponry and pay competitive
salaries to combatants, even though
over time, drug trafficking destroyed
the insurgents politically, corrupted
them, damaged their credibility
and eroded sympathy from
the population.
Violence tied to drugs has two
functions. First, violent force is
used to defend or conquer markets.
In Latin America, supply exceeds
demand due to the low number
of Latin American users and their
limited purchasing power. The
easiest way to enhance revenue is
by stealing market share from other
retailers, unleashing fierce clashes
between criminal organizations. The
second function of drug violence is
related to the illegal nature of the
business. Despite being unlawful
and criminal, the drug industry is
highly regulated, but based on verbal
agreements among multiple actors
and intermediaries. Since there is no
formal way to guarantee that actors
abide by these verbal contracts, the
threat or use of violence is the most
efficient way to force compliance.
Such has been the case in Colombia
and, currently, in Mexico.
Violence by youth gangs
While kingpins of the drug trade
10

are behind the waves of violence,
young gang members are usually on
the frontlines and more than willing
to serve as reliable executioners.
Typically, gangs are formed by
groups of friends that, in the
process of peer socialization, enter
the organizations, seeking identity
and hope for the future. They are
integrated from an early age, and
as a result of their activities, life
expectancy is significantly reduced.
In the big cities of almost every
country, gangs represent models
of successful social organization,
especially in poor areas, slums
and favelas. Youth gangs serve as
operatives; they are the ones in
charge of dealing the drugs, and are
also responsible for the robberies,
assaults and property crimes
that support their organizations.
(Personal items and jewelry have
been replaced by cellphones and
tablets as the gangs’ loot of choice).

Analyses of the causes and effects
of gang wars must go beyond
“small business” or “defense
of market” models; gang wars
are about clashes over territory,
community protection and
identity, and are extremely violent.
Although gangs are responsible for
carrying out violent acts, they are
viewed by the communities, and
by their members, as self-defense
mechanisms. As long as there is
no state strong enough to provide
effective protection for those who
live in a particular neighborhood,
the gang that controls that
neighborhood will continue to
operate and perpetrate violence.

Gangs are part of the communities
in which their members live, and
their identity and the complicit
silence (or support) that they receive
correspond to their turf. They are
feared and valued at the same time
because, in the absence of police
protection, local gangs establish
themselves as the only defense
inhabitants have against potential
violent aggression by other gangs.
This protective function, despite its
associated acts of violence, grants
them recognition that reinforces
their local status and strengthens
their ability to attract new young
members. It is through youth gangs,
and violence, that some young
people are able to improve their
economic and social status.

Organized crime violence
Over time, guerrilla groups, drug
dealers and gangs have gradually
become complex organizations
directly linked to organized crime.
Following the definitions of the
Palermo Convention, most nations’
laws define organized crime as
three or more people who commit
a crime on a recurring basis and
for economic purposes. In Latin
America, organized crime involves
structures with a lot more than
three people and a robust hierarchy
that allows for the delegation of
tasks and a line of command. The
Central American maras, the First
Command of the Capital (PCC)
of Brazil, and the bandas criminales
(bacrim) in Colombia are clear
expressions of this phenomenon,
as are the surviving guerrillas or
paramilitary groups, given their
actions and means of control. The
most important difference has to do
with changes in the way revenue
is generated.

Gang wars have resulted in
many deaths in cities across the
region. Each war has its own
dynamics, and thus, should be
interpreted in a wider context.

Gangs make their income via
predatory crime, stealing from
people and retailers, kidnapping,
contracting hit men, and charging
for the delivery of “security services.”
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A battalion of the Military Police Special Operations unit occupied the favelas of Parque União, Nova Holanda, and Mare in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on
March 25, 2014. WILTON JUNIOR/ESTADAO CONTEUDO/Agencia Estado via AP Images
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As is common in organized crime,
they also branch out into extortion.
Organized crime victims are not
robbed, kidnapped or murdered;
they are simply charged a small fee
on a weekly or monthly basis to
avoid harm. In other words, the
business of organized crime is the
protection of its victims. Organized
crime entities extort victims for
protection from other crime groups
and, of course, from themselves.
This difference between gang
activities and the mafia-type
activities of organized crime
affords two important advantages
to the latter. On one hand, while
it is true that a larger amount of
money can be obtained from a
single operation—i.e. theft or the
kidnapping of a businessman—it
is also true that extorting small
amounts of money from many
people can generate high levels of
income. Moreover, those operations
can be done in a recurring and
parasitic fashion, guaranteeing
a constant flow of cash for the
organization. The regular income
allows for “improving” the criminal
organization; it enables it to
buy better weaponry, expand or
guarantee the permanence of its
members, and pay necessary bribes
to the authorities.
In those areas where it manages
to establish itself, organized crime
replaces the state and roguishly
carries out its functions, as has
happened in the vast border region
between Colombia and Venezuela:
in the states of César, Norte
de Santander and Meta on the
Colombian side, and Zulia, Tachira,
and Apure in Venezuela. To ensure
that nothing happens to them or
their families—and to remove the
risk of losing even one emaciated
cow—the guerrilla and paramilitary
groups impose laws and sanctions
12

and, as is common in organized
crime, charge businesspeople,
transporters and farmers a monthly
fee they call a “vaccine.”
Police and prison violence
The state’s answer to crime has
also been a violent one, sometimes
as a legitimate exercise and
sometimes as an illegal response
done in a criminal fashion and
resulting in increased violence.
Prisons that should be safe and
controlled spaces end up serving
as headquarters for criminal
coordination, the dissemination
of violence and illicit exports.
Although police forces have
improved in many cities and
countries, many still have difficulties
addressing crime. Perhaps the most
powerful obstacle facing police
is a lack of trust from the people
they serve. Except for the Chilean
Carabineros and, more recently,
the Colombian National Police,
public opinion surveys show low
levels of public trust in and respect
for police organizations in Latin
America. (See the infographic on
page 6). Changing public opinion
is no easy task. Generally speaking,
the processes used to select police in
Latin America are inadequate and,
once recruited, officers are poorly
trained and severely underpaid.
Additionally, the military’s strong
focus on tactics, doctrine and
organization have altered police
practices and image. Police are
viewed as defenders of government
interests rather than guardians of
citizen security.
Police institutions must also
grapple with two types of crime
within their own ranks. The first
type results from officers taking
justice into their own hands when
the system fails to prosecute and
sentence apprehended criminals.

Such practices have led to the
emergence of an institutional culture
in which police believe they are not
only the law, but also above the law.
The second type develops over time
and on the job. Essentially, police
officers become corrupted, complicit
and ultimately involved in criminal
activities. They end up either
extorting criminals or morphing
into offenders who use their
knowledge and badge as a license
to break the law.
Gender violence
Approximately 90% of violent
crime victims are male, but
experiences in Brazil show that
gender-based violence is also a
problem. Before the Peacekeeping
Police Units (UPP) arrived in the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro, there
were virtually no complaints of
violence against women in those
communities. The issue seemed to
be nonexistent and without political
or social relevance. Ultimately,
the UPP managed to physically
remove the criminal organizations,
or quadrilhas, from the favelas.
The moment they did so, crime
decreased; complaints about gender
violence however, significantly
increased. These changes are
attributed to the fact that the
displacement of the criminal
organizations from the areas they
controlled provided state social
services with an entrée into the
communities, and thus, a space for
the reporting or denouncement
of gender violence. With a focus
no longer fully consumed by the
violence of the quadrilhas, people
were able to look at violence more
closely, and new realities came to
light. When attention shifted to
issues related to families, households
and labor markets, gender violence
emerged unmistakably. This stands to
reason considering that on a microsocial level, violence against women is
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about power, money, sexuality and all
of the associated complexities.
One particular and often surprising
characteristic of gender-based
violence is that the most lethal
homicides and life-threatening
injuries are generally committed
against men. Gender-based violence
against women may also be deadly,
but in general, the violence women
experience tends to be more chronic
rather than lethal. For example,
women tend to suffer injury more
often than homicide and are
especially vulnerable to violent
robbery. (Regarding non-violent
theft, male and female victimization
rates are almost the same).
To address gender-based violence
and policy, governments have
created laws and special offices
to field complaints and protect
potential victims. Significant
progress has been made in almost
every country, but more effective
strategies need to be developed.
For example, gender-based violence
must be viewed in the context of
the general crime trends of a given
country when developing policy.
Additionally, it is important to
consider women’s perspectives and
draw from the female experience.
Historically in the region, an
androcentric vision has driven antiviolence policies and favored the
use of military-oriented responses
to social problems. Women’s
perspectives would improve
effectiveness and efficiency.
THE HETEROGENEITY
OF VIOLENCE ACROSS
THE REGION
Although world statistics rank
Latin America as the most violent
region in the world, the truth is
that levels of violence vary greatly
from country to country and even
from province to province. If one

considers Colombia’s past or the
current situation in Venezuela and
El Salvador, extraordinary levels of
violence predominate. However, in
other countries in the region, such
as Uruguay, Chile or Costa Rica,
homicide rates have been lower than
in the United States for years.
Such variations in levels of
violence must be highlighted and
understood. Currently, the Latin
American region could be divided
into three groups: countries that are
becoming more secure; countries
where violence and criminality
are rising; and countries that are
managing to keep their public
security conditions stable.
Colombia presents the most
significant change in the region.
After decades of rural guerrillas,
deadly struggles between drug
trafficking organizations and
paramilitary violence, Colombia
has undergone a remarkable
transformation. The country has
seen a significant reduction in its
homicide, kidnapping and robbery
rates for over a decade. Cities such
as Medellín and Bogotá, whose
inhabitants once lived under a
constant state of siege due to crime,
today enjoy a much safer public
space. Colombia’s oldest and most
infamous guerrilla group, the FARC,
has already announced a ceasefire and the incorporation of its
combatants into civil life. Of course,
the country is not yet a paradise and
many problems and risks persist.
Colombia’s murder rate has been
cut in half when compared to its
levels in the mid-1990s; however,
its homicide rate of 30 per 100,000
inhabitants is still high. In addition,
one guerrilla group, the ELN,
remains operational, and the risk of
recently demobilized FARC guerrilla
combatants becoming common
criminals is very high.

Another country that has
experienced important changes is
Brazil. For a long time, the country’s
image was based on a belief in two
Brazils. Called “Belindia” by some
authors, one was the rich, beautiful
(“Bel”) south and the other, the
poor (“India”) north. Historically,
Brazil’s violence was concentrated
in the rich states of the south (São
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas
Gerais), and not in the impoverished
areas of the north. This situation
has changed in the last two decades
thanks to policies applied in the
south to reduce crime, especially
in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
Violence and crime have essentially
been displaced to the northeast,
where now, not only the state of
Pernambuco but also others like
Ceará show high levels of violence.
All in all, between the decrease of
violence and crime in some areas
and the increase in others, the
country has managed to maintain
the homicide rate at about 23 per
100,000 inhabitants.
Another country that has
significantly reduced its levels
of violence is Peru. The violence
and terror of Sendero Luminoso
was ultimately brought to an
end thanks to the authorities and
citizenry. Moving freely through
the streets and traveling across
the country safely was once
impossible, but all of that has
changed in just a few years.
There is no consensus among
analysts and observers as to the
reasons for these particular changes,
but, most agree, they should not
be underestimated.
On the opposite extreme, two
countries that thirty years ago
did not even appear on the list
of “danger zones” today have the
distinction of being considered the
most violent nations in a region
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A FARC guerrilla couple takes care of a baby at their camp at the Transitional Standardization Zone in Pondores, Colombia on April 3, 2017. The
Colombian government is building accommodations that will house FARC guerrillas until the end of the disarmament process, as per the November
2016 peace agreement. JOAQUIN SARMIENTO/AFP/Getty Images

already known for being violent.
These countries are Venezuela and
Honduras. For years, Venezuela was
not considered a dangerous country;
it had defeated a guerrilla force and
managed to maintain high levels of
prosperity and social mobility. In
fact, some studies of violence did
not even include Venezuela as part
of the research because the country
did not “qualify.” Since then, the
major failures of both the Chávez
and Maduro administrations, and
their so-called class struggle and
revolution, have destroyed the
economy, the gross national product
and the fabric of society. Although
the Venezuelan government has
14

strictly censored crime data for more
than a decade, some top government
officials put the homicide rate at 62
per 100,000 inhabitants, while other
independent sources estimate it at
about 90 per 100,000.
El Salvador, which for years
suffered political violence and, later,
criminal gangs, is a more ambiguous
case. The government and the
gangs, or maras, negotiated an
agreement in an effort to reduce
violence and homicides. This socalled “truce” generated a great deal
of hope, and many Salvadorans
expected to see the development
and implementation of conciliatory

policies. However, recent evidence
has shown that instead of the truce
weakening the gangs and reducing
violence, youth gangs have managed
to exploit it and further strengthen
themselves. They have kept their
territorial domain intact and
continue to contribute to everincreasing levels of homicide.
In Mexico, the high crime and
violence areas of the north, such
as Chihuahua and Sonora, coexist
with the rather peaceful Yucatan
Peninsula, including Quintana
Roo. Mexico City, despite its large
population, has a homicide rate
of fewer than 10 per 100,000, a
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lower rate when compared to other
cities. The country of Mexico as a
whole experienced a slow but steady
reduction from the 1990s until 2008.
Then, as a result of changes in the
drug market and an aggressive
security policy, power structures and
illicit markets underwent significant
transformations and imbalances,
resulting in an increase in drug
trafficking-related violence.
While the current situations in
Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador
and Mexico seem grim, other
countries in the region have kept
their levels of violence and crime
relatively stable and low in
comparison. These include Chile,
Uruguay and Argentina in the
Southern Cone; and Costa Rica
and Nicaragua in Central America.
Although each country’s social and
political conditions differ from the
next, all have homicide rates lower
than ten per 100,000 inhabitants. In
the case of the countries with midlevel crime rates, Ecuador, Bolivia
and Paraguay, experts hypothesize
that existing mechanisms of
traditional social control underpin
the legitimacy of coercive force and
help mitigate crime in both rural
and suburban communities.
An always provisional balance
The manifestations of violence in
Latin America reflect a landscape
even more diverse and dynamic
than we have been able to convey
in this article. If we seek to draw
conclusions, we can state that crime
has moved from rural to urban areas,
that conflict between power and
subversion (or political opposition)
has been displaced by conflict and
violence related to illegal business
and extortion economies, and that
extra-judicial violence by security
forces and the ever-deteriorating
control of prison environments have
undermined the rule of law.

A fair share of the academic
literature and political discourse
on this topic has been devoted to
explaining crime as the result of
precarious social conditions, and it
can be argued that poverty, family
abandonment and inequality are
indeed behind much of the violence.
The experiences of countries that
have managed to reduce homicides
and crime points us in another
direction, however. During the
period in which violence in
Colombia declined, poverty did
not, nor did inequality. In Brazil,
violence is somehow under control
and, at the same time, successful
social programs have reduced
poverty levels and increased school
attendance and employment. In
Venezuela, where official data
indicate that poverty and inequality
dropped more than in Brazil
during the same years, the opposite
happened, despite the redistribution
of wealth from increased oil
revenues. Homicides, kidnapping,
robberies and drug trafficking rose
like never before in the history of
the country. What is clear from
these experiences, whether positive
or negative, is that in Brazil and
Colombia institutions and the rule
of law were strengthened, whereas in
Venezuela they were destroyed.

and expansion of a collective space
where diverse groups can coexist and
imagine themselves sharing a future.
Roberto Briceño-León is a Venezuelan
sociologist, professor at the Universidad
Central de Venezuela and coordinator of
Venezuela’s Violence Observatory (OVV),
which pools the efforts of seven Venezuelan
universities to study and prevent violence.

The changing face of violence
in Latin America indicates that
social programs are necessary
but insufficient and that law
enforcement policies are important
so long as excessive force or
corrupt criminal police activities
do not distort or undermine them.
Controlling and reducing violence
and crime requires reinforcing
the social pact, strengthening the
rules of the game, and bolstering
institutions. Safety and peace entail
the construction of democracy and
the strengthening of the citizenry,
not to mention the consolidation
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Data at a Glance
Homicide Rates in Mexico & Central America | 2003-2015
(Rate x 100,000 population)
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https://homicide.igarape.org.br/ UNODC Homicide Statistics: Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants (2000-2014).

Homicide Rates in Selected Caribbean Countries & Puerto Rico | 2003-2015
(Rate x 100,000 population)
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Only partial data available for Cuba, Haiti and Trinidad & Tobago.
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Homicide Rates in the Andes | 2003-2015
(Rate x 100,000 population)
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Cost of Crime in Latin American Countries as a Percentage of GDP in 2014
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Source: Jaitman, Laura & Ivan Torre. 2017. “Estimation of the Direct Costs of Crime and Violence.” In The Costs of Crime and Violence: New
Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean. Laura Jaitman (editor). Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, p.27.

Robbery Rates in Latin America and the Caribbean | 2003-2014
(Rate x 100,000 inhabitants)
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The Politics of Femicide
in Latin America
by Gema Santamaría and María Huesca

I

t has been four decades since
Diana E.H. Russell shed light
on the gendered dimension of
violence with her definition
of femicide as “the killing
of females by males because they
are female.” The sexual politics of
murder, she explained, played a role
in perpetuating this form of violence
across historical periods and regions.
In the Latin American context,
scholars such as Marcela Lagarde
adopted and further developed
the term, and the Spanish word
feminicidio has become a valuable
tool for mobilizing different sectors
of society. It has been central to
the campaign to raise awareness of
the killings of hundreds of young
women, many of them maquila
workers, in the Mexican border
city of Ciudad Juárez, and to the
struggle and demands of women’s
movements in countries such as
Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina,
Nicaragua and Brazil.
As is often the case with concepts
that travel, Lagarde’s feminicidio
was not merely a translation of
Russell’s definition. In Latin
America, impunity became a key
explanatory factor for the scope of
the problem and its persistence. The
politics and meaning of feminicidio
refer specifically to the actions
and omissions of state institutions
and public officials that add to
the reproduction of this form of
violence in Latin America. In this
article, we analyze quantitative

aspects and patterns of femicide,
concluding with some reflections
on its political dimensions.
Rates of femicide in the region
According to a 2012 Small Arms
Survey report, 25 of the countries
with high and very high incidences
of femicide are in the Americas. El
Salvador tops the list, followed by
Jamaica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Bolivia and Colombia. In these
countries, femicide rates are
anywhere from 7 to 12 per 100,000
inhabitants. Except for Bolivia,
all of the countries in question are
characterized by high levels of lethal
violence in general, as well as by
the presence of organized criminal
gangs and drug-trafficking
organizations (DTOs).
Data from the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) confirm this trend.
According to its latest report on
global homicide, the countries of
the northern triangle of Central
America are among those with
the highest female homicide rates,
followed by Venezuela, Colombia,
Mexico and Bolivia. In all of
these countries, homicide rates
for males are considerably higher
than those for women. On average,
the homicide rate for men in the
Americas is 29.3, compared to 3.7
for females. This difference is all the
more striking in certain countries.
According to UN and UNODC
statistics, for example, the male

homicide rate in Honduras in 2011
was approximately 163 per 100,000;
the female homicide rate for the
same year was 11.4. In Guatemala,
the homicide rate for men was 82.5
per 100,000 in 2009, compared
to approximately 9.8 per 100,000
for women. These numbers are
consistent with global trends:
Across different countries and
regions, lethal violence directly
affects men at a much higher rate
than it does women.
Despite its relatively lower rate
of occurrence, however, female
homicide has specific characteristics
that make it a subject of special
concern. According to the
UNODC, 47% of female homicides
around the world are committed
by an intimate partner or family
member. The percentage is lower in
Latin America; in this region, only
38% of femicides are perpetrated
by a partner or family member.
When broken down by country, the
disparity is even more pronounced.
For example, in Uruguay, a country
with a relatively low homicide rate,
the percentage of women victimized
by a family member or an intimate
partner is 58.5%. In contrast,
in El Salvador-one of the most
violent countries in the regionthe number is as low as 4%. These
figures suggest that, at least in
certain countries, other dynamics
beyond the domestic or private
sphere are at play in the organization
of violence.
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Patterns of femicide
The patterns of femicide in the
region follow a range of logics and
pose different challenges. Cases
perpetrated by intimate partners and
family members are more directly
linked to traditional forms of
domestic violence. According
to a study by the Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO)
covering 11 countries across the
region, one in every 10 women
reported being a victim of violence
at the hands of an intimate partner
at least once in her lifetime. This
percentage is particularly high in
some countries, including Bolivia
and Peru, where more than 40%
of women reported having been
victimized by intimate partners.
Research has shown that violence
within the domestic sphere tends to
escalate, going from psychological
and physical forms of abuse
to lethal violence. Due to the
intricate dynamics of intimidation
and economic and emotional
dependence, violence within the
domestic sphere is notoriously
difficult to prevent, report
and prosecute.

SALVADOR MELÉNDEZ
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Femicides associated with
organized crime and gang-related
violence point to an increasing
role for women as both victims
and victimizers. In other words,
killings by and of women in the
public sphere reflect the growing
recruitment and victimization of
women by criminal organizations.
They also expose the increasing
participation of these groups in
criminal activities such as human
trafficking and sexual exploitation,
which have a greater impact on
women and girls. This is particularly
true in Mexico, Colombia and
the northern triangle of Central
America. Criminal organizations
such as Los Zetas reach beyond
drug trafficking to the extortion
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and exploitation of immigrants,
including women. Prostitution
and sex trafficking networks are
active in Mexico’s southern border
region and states along routes for
Central American immigrants,
such as Veracruz and Tamaulipas.
Femicides in the public sphere are
also a reflection of the militarized
strategies adopted by Mexico and
the countries of the northern
triangle. Human rights reports
point to an increase in human
rights violations as a direct result of
these policies. Killings of women
have also increased, as have forced
disappearances and torture.
Although private and public
expressions of femicide are often
considered in isolation, in practice
they are connected in significant
ways. For instance, the victimization
of women by human trafficking and
sexual exploitation networks often
begins at home and can be directly
connected to intimate partner
violence. Partners or other family
members typically recruit women
for such networks by promising
them a job in another city or
country. This dynamic has been
documented among Mexican and
Central American female migrants
who fall victim to forced labor,
prostitution and sexual exploitation
on their way to the United States.
The same is true of women’s
involvement in drug-trafficking
organizations (DTOs). In Mexico,
for instance, women often enter
DTOs through filial or sentimental
relationships. Due to the gendered
dynamics of domination, women
consistently occupy the lowest ranks
within these criminal organizations,
but the law disproportionately
penalizes them. In countries as
different as Chile, Peru, Argentina
and El Salvador, more than half
of female prison inmates are
serving time for drug trafficking

and possession, a statistic well
above the percentage of male
inmates doing time for
similar offenses.
The politics of femicide
The political dimension of
femicide in Latin America is mainly
expressed by the actions and, even
more so, the omissions of states
in investigating, prosecuting and
punishing women-related killings.
While most Latin American
countries have adopted specific
policies or national plans to
combat violence against women,
these efforts remain chronically
underfunded and suffer from a lack
of coordination and articulation.
This deficit in the state’s capacity
to fully perform its role translates
into neglect of the problem and
impunity for the individuals and
criminal organizations involved. In
Guatemala, for example, 98% of
femicides go unpunished, and in
Honduras, the impunity rate has
been calculated at 93.5%.
In many cases, the omissions go
beyond institutional paralysis to
active involvement by state actors
in perpetuating violence against
women. This is especially true
in contexts where the state has
increased the discretionary power
of police and military personnel
to combat crime. In Mexico, for
instance, femicides have increased
40% since 2006, the year the
country officially launched its war
on drugs. In Honduras, killings of
women rose by more than 200%
between 2002 and 2010, a period
that coincides with the escalation of
militarized anti-narcotics and antigang policies.
The prevalence of femicide in
the region cannot be understood
in a vacuum. Rather, it should
be viewed within a broader

sociopolitical context characterized
by gendered dynamics of exclusion
and discrimination in the family,
schools, economy and public sphere.
Effective responses to femicide
must address the institutional and
social roots of the phenomenon.
Evidence suggests that specialized
and gender-sensitive police units
can contribute to the reporting of
intra-family or intimate partner
violence. The creation of shelters
with the support of civil society and
grassroots organizations has also
proven instrumental in providing
immediate assistance and protection
for the victims of domestic violence,
sexual exploitation and human
trafficking. Beyond these measures,
policy responses need to address the
victimization of women by criminal
syndicates. To investigate and
prosecute such crimes, governments
will have to allocate additional
resources beyond programs focused
solely on prevention.
Either by their actions or their
omissions, Latin American states
have shown that they play a critical
role in the perpetuation and
persistence of femicide. Ni una más
(not one more) and ni una menos
(nor one less) have become rallying
cries for civil society organizations
and women’s movements across the
region. To fulfill these pledges, states
must acknowledge the political
dimension of femicide and ensure
justice is done for female victims
and their families.
Gema Santamaría is a Nicaraguan-born
historian who teaches in the Department
of International Studies at Instituto
Tecnológico Autónomo de México
(ITAM). María Huesca is a senior in
the International Relations program at
the same institution.
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Victims and Perpetrators:

Youth and Violence in Latin America
by José Miguel Cruz

Y

outh bear the brunt of
the wave of criminal
violence affecting
Latin America and the
Caribbean. According to
the 2013 Global Study on Homicide
published by the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, one in
seven murder victims in the world
is a young male aged 15-29 living
in the Americas. Homicide rates for
male youth in Latin America, widely
considered the most violent region in
the world, are more than four times
the global average. In Honduras
alone, the 2012 homicide rate for
males 15-29 surpassed 280 per
100,000. And in Brazil, the country
with the most victims in the region,
killings of youth 10-29 consistently
account for more than 55% of all
homicides in the country, according
to data collected by Arturo Alvarado,
a professor at the Colegio de México.
Young people are conspicuous
actors in regional criminal activities
in general, especially in urban
centers. Youth gangs rule the
streets in a number of cities and
impoverished communities across
Latin America and the Caribbean.
In Colombia, the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela, street gangs
commonly recruit minors as young as
11 years old. In the northern triangle
of Central America (Guatemala,
El Salvador and Honduras), where
the so-called maras have expanded
and openly challenged national
governments, gangs compel aspiring
members to murder people from
22

rival territories just to be considered
serious candidates for joining the
organization. In Mexico, data
collected by the Secretaría de
Gobernación’s Victimization Survey
found that 33.5% of murders
committed in that country in
2013 were perpetrated by youth
aged 25 or younger. Violence is
a tool not only of criminal
syndicates, but also of self-directed
youngsters reacting to the forces of
exclusionary environments.
The impact of youth violence
It is impossible to understand the
problems of crime and insecurity
in the hemisphere without taking
into account the participation of
young people in the dynamics of
violence, whether as its victims or
perpetrators. Likewise, it is not
possible to fully grasp the impact
of criminal violence on a broad
range of issues, from development
to economic growth and political
stability, without considering young
people and their relationships with
social and political institutions. The
soaring levels of youths victimized,
usually at the hands of their peers,
have an outsized impact on Latin
American societies. Youth-related
violence not only increases the
morbidity and mortality of a
population otherwise characterized
by its optimal health, but also affects
economic productivity and limits
the potential for innovation that
young people represent. According
to a recent report by the InterAmerican Development Bank,

crime costs countries in the region
an average of nearly 3.5% of GDP,
with Honduras, El Salvador, Jamaica,
and Brazil paying well above this
level. Young populations victimized
by violence add a disproportionate
burden to health care systems and
social services, while youth gangs
and violent juveniles strain criminal
justice systems and overcrowd prisons
across the region. All of these issues
divert government resources and
private initiatives from development
programs and productive activities.
The impact of violence can also
be seen in the region’s political
climate. Latin American societies
trapped in waves of violence are
more inclined toward censorship
and limit the public spaces where
youth can create and thrive. They
tend to empower institutions
and actors with the potential to
suppress tolerance, freedom and
inventiveness. They are also more
likely to scapegoat young people,
especially the underprivileged, for
many of the social ills affecting their
communities. In some societies in
Latin America and the Caribbean,
young people not only are the
most frequent victims of violence
and its most visible perpetrators,
but are also portrayed as the main
parties responsible for the violence,
insecurity and social instability inside
their troubled countries. As several
studies have documented, such
representations are largely shaped by
political forces, part of social systems
that keep disadvantaged youth

Hemisphere Volume 26

16224_SIPA_LACC-Hemisphere Mag 2017.indd 22

7/25/17 12:47 PM

Reports

away from political representation
and decision-making processes.
This is particularly evident in
extremely unequal countries, where
large masses of unemployed and
impoverished young males are
automatically labeled as a threat
to stability.

children and young people.
They turn to criminal activities
and violence is the currency of choice
in their daily relationships, even
within the household and schools,
because violence is the only skill
they have learned and used in their
immediate environments.

In fact, a closer look at the
dynamics of youth-related crime in
countries experiencing significant
outbreaks of violence suggests that
this problem can be attributed
at least in part to the failure of
social and political institutions
to incorporate young people into
mainstream politics. In most
countries of the region, social
segregation of young people and
the economic constraints they
suffer are the result not of brazen
discrimination or political repression,
as was the case under the former
military dictatorships, but instead
of sustained processes of exclusion
that permeate the institutions
of socialization. Exclusion starts
at home, is legitimized in the
classroom and constantly reinforced
in the community.

The political dimension
These problems and exclusionary
dynamics are not new, but they have
exploded across the region in the last
few decades because of the failure
of political establishments to reform
institutions and enact policies that
recognize and address the structural
and demographic changes occurring
in the wake of political transitions,
the Washington Consensus and the
information revolution. A number
of Latin American and Caribbean
countries experienced the peak
of a youth bulge between 2005
and 2015, significantly straining
education systems, job markets and
social services. Instead of channeling
resources toward those areas, many
governments resorted to draconian
anti-crime policies and drug wars
that defunded and debilitated the
social institutions that nurtured
and protected youth. The socalled northern triangle of Central
America is a case in point: Plagued
by the highest crime rates in the
world, Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras have consistently had
some of the lowest rates of public
social expenditure in the region,
while their security budgets have
substantially increased.

Research across the hemisphere
—the United States included—has
found a strong connection between
criminal gangs, state-sponsored
vigilante groups, and other violent
organizations, on the one hand,
and dysfunctional and abusive
families, neglected and underfunded
school districts, and derelict and
underserved communities, on the
other. Many youngsters transition
into adulthood from the marginal
edges of Latin America, where
deprivation, despair and violence
prevail. In the favelas of Brazil’s
megacities, the villas miseria of
Buenos Aires, and impoverished rural
communities in Mexico and Central
America, violent groups become the
“natural” reference points for many

that rose to power in the early 2000s
failed to transform the dynamics of
exclusion perpetuated by the key
institutions of socialization. In many
cases, governments coupled welfare
policies with anxious discourses and
violent campaigns against youth and
the communities benefiting from
public subsidies.
Ultimately, youth-related violence
in Latin America and the Caribbean
is as much a political challenge as it
is a law enforcement or judicial one.
In addition to the basic mechanisms
of exclusion that perpetuate criminal
violence, the problem is linked
to political dynamics that seek to
criminalize certain social groups
for electoral gain. In Latin America
and the Caribbean, young people
between the ages of 15 and 29
represent more than 25% of the
population. As long as governments
continue to ignore the systemic
marginalization and victimization
of their country’s youth, it will be
impossible to address the high levels
of violence in the region. To tackle
criminal violence, Latin American
societies not only need to enact
policies that address the plights
and concerns of young people,
but also give them a voice in the
political system.
José Miguel Cruz is a political scientist and
the director of research at the Kimberly
Green Latin American and Caribbean
Center at Florida International University.

For many young people living in
impoverished slums and neglected
communities across the region, the
societal transformations that sprang
from cycles of political reforms have
done very little to encourage a sense
of opportunity and social mobility.
Even the ambitious social programs
implemented by the populist regimes
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Drug Trafficking and Violence
in Latin America:
Trends, Challenges and Lessons Learned
by Jonathan Rosen

L

atin American countries
have been afflicted
by drug trafficking
and organized crime
for decades. Criminal
organizations use violence to
intimidate rival cartels, citizens,
government officials and law
enforcement. Yet government policies
are also in part responsible for the
high levels of violence. Iron fist
(mano dura) strategies designed to
combat organized crime throughout
the region have led to spikes in
violence in Colombia, Mexico,
Brazil, El Salvador and various other
countries. After passing mano dura
and super mano dura programs to
combat gangs in the early 2000s,
for example, El Salvador surpassed
Honduras as the most violent
non-warring country in the world,
with 104 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants in 2015.
The kingpin strategy
One of the most common strategies
Latin American governments have
implemented to combat drug
trafficking and organized crime
is the so-called kingpin strategy,
which holds that eliminating cartel
leaders is the key to toppling drug
trafficking organizations. In practice,
the kingpin strategy can lead to more
violence as rival cartels compete
for control of territory and drug
trafficking routes, and individuals
within the organization jockey for
power and leadership.

24

The case of Pablo Escobar, the
ruthless leader of Colombia’s
Medellín cartel in the 1980s and
early 1990s, reveals the shortcomings
of the kingpin strategy. Although
the Medellín cartel collapsed after
Escobar was killed in a firefight
with the Colombian authorities
in 1993, drug trafficking in this
South American country continued
unabated. In Mexico, too, the
administration of President Felipe
Calderón (2006-2012) focused on
capturing the leaders of major drug
trafficking organizations, charting its
success by the number of top capos
and drug shipments seized. However,
drug violence proliferated during
this government: During the six
years of the Calderón administration,
26,000 people disappeared and
70,000 deaths were attributed to
drug-related violence. Some sources
put the death toll as high as 120,000.
The violence has continued unabated
under President Enrique Peña Nieto:
During the first 45 months of his
administration, 78,109 narcoexecutions have been recorded, with
some of the highest tolls in the states
of Mexico (1,326), Guerrero (1,267)
and Chihuahua (771).
One of the problems of the
kingpin strategy, University of
Miami Political Science Professor
Bruce Bagley points out, is the
fragmentation of drug cartels. The
toppling of the Medellín and Cali
cartels, for example, resulted in

the emergence of 300 cartelitos.
Mexico had six major drug
trafficking organizations in 2006;
by 2012, Attorney General Jesús
Murillo Karam reported that the
number had increased more than
tenfold to between 60 and 80.
The fragmentation of cartels into
smaller organizations makes it even
more difficult for the government
to dismantle groups competing for
control of drug routes, territory
and markets.
The militarization of the
war on drugs
The increasing violence in Latin
America is intricately connected
to the militarization of the war on
drugs. In Mexico, President Calderón
deployed the military to combat
the increasing power and presence
of drug cartels. By definition, the
military should protect against
external threats and enemies, while
police forces are responsible for
internal security. Calderón turned
to the military because he did
not have confidence in Mexico’s
notoriously corrupt police. The
newly militarized war against drug
trafficking organizations, however,
led to a dramatic increase in violence.
The war fragmented criminal
organizations, spurring territorial
battles between different groups and
against state institutions. From 2008
to 2012, for example, Ciudad Júarez,
just across the border from El Paso,
Texas, was the most dangerous city in
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the world due to the impact of
drug trafficking and organized
crime. Across Mexico, 123 journalists
or media-support workers were
killed between 2006 and 2015
as drug traffickers and criminal
organizations targeted politicians,
human rights activists, journalists
and other groups critical of
their activities.

many experts are arguing that
drugs should be viewed as a health
issue as opposed to a security
problem. Drug trafficking will exist
as long as there is demand for its
product. Countries should spend
fewer resources on combating
the supply of drugs and more
on treatment, rehabilitation and
education, these experts maintain.

Other countries have also suffered
from drug-related violence following
a state’s decision to militarize the
drug war. Various cities in Brazil have
experienced spikes in violence as a
result of organized crime groups such
as First Capital Command (Primeiro
Comando da Capital, or PCC) in São
Paulo. In the northeast, Salvador,
the capital of the state of Bahia, had
a murder rate of 60 per 100,000
in 2015, surpassing Rio de Janeiro
(21.5 per 100,000).

Other challenges
To effectively combat organized
crime, drug trafficking and violence,
governments need to address the
deeper challenges that exist in their
societies. Corruption and impunity
are especially insidious problems
in many Latin American countries.
Impunity rates in Mexico and
Venezuela, for instance, are as high
as 99% and 98%, respectively.
Néstor Humberto Martínez, the
chief prosecutor of Colombia,
has cited similar figures for his
country. Instead of deploying
the military to combat criminals,
countries should focus on
strengthening their institutions.
Roberto Zepeda Martínez, a
researcher at the Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México,
stresses the need to combat the
corruption and impunity that enable
criminal organizations to bribe and
intimidate government officials,
politicians and security personnel.

On their own, drug trafficking
and organized crime do not
necessarily result in high levels
of violence, but militarizing the
drug war causes violence to spike.
Critics of the tactic argue that the
government is winning minor
battles but losing the war.
Leaders are captured and convicted,
but the prisons they are sent to
are plagued by overcrowding and
function as schools of crime.
Drug trafficking and other illicit
activities continue behind prison
walls, and countless escapes have
occurred from prisons throughout
Latin America. Militarization
also does nothing to address the
underlying problems in many
countries, including high levels
of corruption, inequality and
unemployment. Ethan Nadelmann
and Bruce Bagley argue that drugs
are cheaper and more readily
available today than ever before,
an indication of the failure of
supply-side strategies. Increasingly,

In addition to corruption,
countries throughout the region
are plagued by inequality and
various other socioeconomic
challenges. Twenty million
youths in Latin America are
known as ninis because they
neither work nor study (ni estudian,
ni trabajan). Young people who
lack educational and employment
opportunities are vulnerable
to joining drug trafficking
organizations, which actively
recruit them.

Lesson learned?
Many states in Latin America
have long histories of conflict and
structural violence. Drug trafficking
and organized crime, as well as
counternarcotic strategies, have
played a role in escalating the
problem. Addressing the violence
will require governments to learn the
lessons of past failures. Many leaders
throughout the region, rejecting
the cost of the drug war in terms
of bloodshed, have called for a new
paradigm. Alternative strategies
are being debated, including
decriminalization and legalization.
While there are no magic solutions
for ending structural violence
in Latin America, the change in
discourse over the past several years
demonstrates that policymakers are
at least looking for creative solutions.
Some leaders, however, seem
not to have learned from the failed
policies of the drug war. Mauricio
Macri, the president of Argentina
since 2015, has reverted to hardline
policies to combat drugs and
crime in that country. While some
governments are moving away from
the failed paradigm of the drug
war, others are continuing the same
strategies. Drug-related violence will
continue if successive administrations
persist in implementing the same
failed policies.
Jonathan D. Rosen is an international
studies specialist at the Jack D. Gordon
Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship
Studies at Florida International University.
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Changing Course:

Criminal Justice Reform
in Latin America

by Mirte Postema

C

riminal violence has
been on the rise in the
Americas in the last
15 years, despite efforts
by the authorities
to contain it by putting more
offenders behind bars. With mass
imprisonment failing to improve
citizen security, governments need
to consider a different approach
to criminal justice. Instead of
emphasizing incarceration as a
response to insecurity, the focus
should be on prevention,
rethinking how to deal with
crime, and strengthening the
judicial system.
Pretrial detention and
its implications
The incarceration rate in the
Americas is high. Around the
world, the average prison population
rate is 144 per 100,000 inhabitants;
in Latin America, it is 387.
According to data collected by
Roy Walmsley, approximately 110
out of every 100,000 inhabitants
in the Americas are in pretrial
detention. These are people who
are merely suspected of committing
a crime and have yet to be proven
guilty in a court of law. In the
majority of the world’s countries,
the pretrial rate is below 40; in the
Americas, only three countries—
Aruba, Jamaica, and Nicaragua—
are below that level, and 13 states
have rates higher than 150 per
100,000 inhabitants.
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The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights points to a number
of factors to explain the prevalence of
pretrial detention the region. These
include “issues of legal design,” such
as compulsory pretrial detention
for certain crimes; “structural
deficiencies in the administration of
justice systems” that interfere with
judicial independence; and “deeply
rooted [punitive] tendencies in
judicial culture and practice.”
The situation is problematic for
several reasons. First, it indicates
an alarming lack of access to justice
throughout the region. The right to
liberty is fundamental and should
only be restricted in exceptional
circumstances. The fact that 39%
of all people imprisoned in the
Americas have not been convicted
of any crime indicates a worrying
disregard for that right. Second,
research by the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime has found that high
rates of pretrial detention tend to
correlate with prison overcrowding.
This is a considerable problem in the
Americas, where prisons operate at
more than 150% of their capacity in
11 countries. Prison overcrowding
compromises inmate safety and
dignity, reducing the chances of
rehabilitation and contributing to a
vicious cycle of crime and violence.
The importance of public policy
The good news is, we can change
this reality. Studies have shown that
public policy can have a substantial

positive impact on criminal justice
issues. The institutional reforms of
the 1990s, for example, introduced
the accusatory system in Latin
America and strengthened due
process guarantees with the effect
of lowering the pretrial detention
rate. A regional study by the Justice
Center for the Americas showed that
these gains have been at least partly
undone following popular clamor
for mano dura (iron fist) policies
that favor incarceration and harsher
punishments. The same study also
found, however, that support for
mano dura policies is stronger among
people who perceive the state as weak.
Strengthening public institutions,
therefore, is central to efforts to chart
a more constructive way of dealing
with crime and violence.
To contain crime and violence,
states need to develop initiatives
aimed at prevention, including
educational, employment and
psychosocial support programs. Data
collection, including where, when,
and by whom crimes are committed,
is essential to properly target and
tailor such activities within countries
and sub-regions. A connection also
exists between a country’s level of
economic development and citizen
security, with lower-income countries
tending to experience more violent
crime than middle- or higher-income
countries. Economic empowerment
programs, therefore, could play
a major role in preventing crime
and violence.
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Also essential are efforts to
strengthen judicial institutions. Several
studies have shown that the certainty
of punishment, rather than the severity
of sanctions, is the most effective
deterrent. To achieve this effect, all
actors in the justice system—police,
prosecutors, courts, public defenders
and the prison system—need to be
more effective, efficient and respectful
of human rights. The Guatemalan
Public Ministry is an example of the
progress that can be made in this
regard. Starting in 2011, following
a 2009 pilot project, the Ministry
implemented a restructuring to
provide integral attention to victims
and identify patterns among cases.
The new system created teams tasked
with determining whether less severe
or complex cases could be resolved
using conciliation or alternative
solutions, and sharing information
across the Ministry and with other
actors in the criminal justice system.
Important strides were also made to
professionalize the institution and
defend its independence. Following
these reforms, Ministry cases solved
through alternative solutions increased
exponentially, from 5,800 in 2008 to
27,950 in 2013, and convictions more
than doubled, from 3,280 in 2009 to
7,122 in 2013.
The Guatemalan experience holds
valuable lessons for other countries.
Justice institutions can and should
make the necessary efforts to
professionalize their ranks via
transparent and capacity-oriented
hiring procedures. By introducing
laws to govern justice sector careers,
lawmakers can help guarantee the
independence of justice operators,
with oversight by autonomous
administrative bodies. Better
(digitalized) systems make it possible
to share information within and across
institutions and tap into advanced
investigation methods to resolve
complex cases.

A man holds up a sign that reads in Spanish: “CICIG Yes” in reference to the U.N. International
Commission Against Impunity, or CICIG, during a protest against Guatemala's President Otto
Pérez Molina in Guatemala City on Monday, April 20, 2015. MOISES CASTILLO/AP Photo

Given the level of prison
overcrowding in Latin America,
governments need to be willing to
consider unorthodox measures to
create the conditions for structural
reform. One such measure is
the granting of partial pardons.
According to the Pew Charitable
Trusts, between 2008 and 2013,
thirty US states lowered their
imprisonment rates through such
mechanisms as the commutation of
sentences, and all saw reduced crime
levels in the same period. In Italy,
a study conducted by Francesco
Drago and colleagues published
in the Journal of Political Economy
found that people whose sentences
were commuted following passage of
a bill that reduced prison sentences
by three years were less likely to reoffend than those whose convictions
remained untouched. This practice
has been tried in the Americas
in Bolivia, which has granted
presidential pardons and amnesties
to nonviolent offenders for a number
of years. Despite helping to reduce
prison overcrowding, however, it has
done nothing to reverse the country’s

pretrial detention rates, which have
continued to increase.
Lastly, but perhaps most
important, it is essential that societies
as a whole rethink their approach to
criminal justice. For example, the
“war on drugs” has led to lengthy
prison sentences for relatively minor
drug offenses. As the Open Society
Justice Initiative has made clear,
mandatory pretrial detention for
certain crimes overburdens the prison
system and imposes enormous costs
on suspects, their families and the
state. In general, lengthy sentences
make it harder to reintegrate into
society. Interrogating current
policies, therefore, is the most
important first step in reforming the
criminal justice and prison system.
Mirte Postema is a Dutch human rights
specialist. She is a Fellow for Human
Rights, Criminal Justice and Prison
Reform in the Americas at Stanford
Law School.
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Senseless Captivity:

Prisons in Latin America

by Marcelo Bergman

C

rime has risen
dramatically in Latin
America over the
last three decades.
While levels vary
among countries, most states in
the region have higher crime rates
today compared to the 1980s
and ’90s. In response to public
outcry and generalized perceptions
of insecurity, governments have
introduced tougher crime laws,
leading in turn to a significant rise in
the prison population. According to
the International Center for Prison
Studies, the region averaged 225
inmates per 100,000 people in 2013,
compared to 95 per 100,000 in the
early 1990s. Today, more than two
million people in Latin America are
behind bars. If the trend continues,
the prison population is estimated to
reach four million by 2025.
The rise in incarceration, however,
has not slowed the increase in crime.
Some observers argue that without
the tough policies, crime rates would
be even higher, but this is impossible
to prove. In the meantime, mass
imprisonment has led to human
suffering and exacted a high financial
and social cost. An important
question, therefore, is why Latin
American prison systems have been
unable to reduce crime and improve
public security in the region.
Overcrowded and underfunded
Several authors, Andrés Antillano,
Elías Carranza and Fernando Salla
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among them, have provided ample
evidence of prison conditions in the
region ranging from bad to atrocious.
Most prisons are overpopulated; in
many, water and food are scarce.
Corruption is rampant in most
systems, and rehabilitation programs
are few, outdated and ill equipped to
deal with the demands of reinsertion.
In most countries, educational
programs provide only elementarylevel instruction, and less than
one-third of inmates attend classes
regularly. The constitutional mandate
of social rehabilitation has become
an ambitious dream; instead, prisons
have become schools of crime. Many
first-time, nonviolent inmates exit
prisons as professional and violent
offenders already linked to criminal
groups. The author’s own research in
the region suggests that more than
50% of inmates will re-offend, half
of them within the first six months
of leaving the system.
Two interconnected processes
contribute to an extensive
list of shortcomings in the
region’s penitentiary systems:
first, insufficient investment in
infrastructure and rehabilitation
programs; and second, a doubling
of the prison population in most
countries in less than 15 years,
outpacing generous budget
allocations and brand new facilities.
This disparity has contributed to
a serious deterioration in prison
conditions. New prisons rapidly
become obsolete, corruption has

been difficult to contain and,
in countries such as Honduras,
Venezuela and El Salvador, prison
facilities have come under the
control of gangs and other criminal
organizations. Prison authorities
in the region, for the most part,
have had a hard time coping with
mass incarceration.
Who are the inmates?
The prison population in the
region can be classified in multiple
ways. The first is by inmates’ legal
status; in other words, whether they
are in pretrial detention (PTD) or
already sentenced. In most countries,
half the prison population has PTD
status, although this percentage
has been changing as governments
launch a concerted effort to speed
up criminal procedures. These
days, suspects are often expected to
await trial outside prison unless a
judge determines they pose a risk
of evidence tampering or escape.
According to available prison surveys,
however, more than 95% of inmates
are tried while they are already in jail.
The author’s research has found
that approximately 40% of inmates
in Latin American prisons are serving
time for property crimes, most of
them robberies that may include
the use of violence. Between 20%
and 25% of inmates are in jail for
drug-related offenses, less than 20%
for homicides, and between 15%
and 20% for sex-related crimes,
particularly rape. More than one-
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third of prisoners surveyed say they
did not use violence in committing
their offenses.
Most inmates in Latin America
serve, on average, shorter sentences
than in the United States. The
average length is seven years, but
longer sentences for homicides
and sex crimes distort the average.
Although mandatory sentencing has
been extended in recent years, most
inmates serving time for drug crimes
and robberies are serving sentences
that run anywhere from one to six
years. As a consequence, the prison
population in Latin America rotates
rapidly. Half of inmates are released
before they turn 30 years old, and a
significant percentage goes back to
crime soon after release from jail.
Females comprise 5% of the
prison population, but their rate of
incarceration has grown faster than
the rate for males. Women serve time
mainly for two types of felonies:
homicides and drug-related crimes.
The rise in the number of female
inmates reflects their growing role in
transporting drugs (as “mules”) and
selling and delivering small quantities
of illegal narcotics. For some women,
particularly those heading singleparent households, drugs have
become a source of income, and
in many countries in the region,
preschool-aged children are allowed
to live with their mothers in prison.
The burden on families
The incarceration of young
males and heads of families puts an
enormous stress on their households.
Given the poor conditions in most
prisons, many family members
already living in disadvantaged
environments must travel hours
to provide their relatives with the
basic needs prisons fail to furnish:
clothes, sheets, shoes, medicine and
even food. Most of all, incarceration

of a breadwinner puts a significant
stress on other family members to
earn enough money to live. The
imprisonment of a relative often
means a heavy burden for members
of the extended family, some of
whom turn to crime themselves to
supply basic needs for the prisoner
and his or her kin. As children
visit their fathers, brothers, uncles
or mothers in prison, correctional
institutions become familiar places,
losing their deterrence effect. Every
day in Latin America, more than
two million children face the reality
of having at least one close family
member (a parent or sibling) in
jail, and more than three million
children have had a relative
incarcerated during the last two
years. No systematic studies have
examined the effect familiarity
with prisons has on future
criminal behavior, but based on
anthropological work, authors
such as Javier Auyero and
Maria Berti suggest the impact
is significant.
A partial balance
Large-scale imprisonment has
barely affected crime rates in the
region. Robbery rates are high
and growing, domestic illegal
drug markets are expanding, and
violence remains on the rise while
more offenders are admitted to
penitentiary systems. Latin American
correctional facilities do not deter
enough potential criminals and do
not incapacitate enough offenders to
reduce the incidence of crime.

effect of increased incarceration
rates on reducing crime has been
estimated at less than 10%. In short,
putting more people behind bars
does not produce a meaningful
reduction in crime, and no country
in the region has the resources to
house a prison rate of 500 people
per 100,000 inhabitants in
decent facilities.
Prisons in Latin America have
failed in two important ways: They
do not deter, and they do not
incapacitate. Large illegal economies
breed the type of criminality that
prisons are unable to curb or deter.
Most of those arrested are small-time
criminals: muggers, car thieves, drug
dealers and drug mules, the last links
in a long chain of illicit networks
that are quickly replaced. As long as
the market for stolen goods persists
and demand for illegal drugs remains
steady, large criminal organizations
will have an incentive to recruit
foot soldiers.
Marcelo Bergman is an Argentine
sociologist. He is the director of the
Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos
sobre Inseguridad y Violencia (CELIV)
at Universidad Nacional de Tres de
Febrero in Argentina.

Why has doubling the prison
population failed to reduce crime?
Arguing that even more offenders
need to be locked up is problematic,
if only because resources and state
capacities for running a penitentiary
system are limited. Even in the
United States, according to Alfred
Blumstein and Joel Wallman, the
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The Private Sector, States and
Crime in Latin America
by Eduardo Moncada

T

here is no question
that criminal violence
in Latin America
disproportionately
affects the most
vulnerable populations, but it
also has a cost for Latin America’s
business community and, in turn,
the region’s economic potential.
Alongside longstanding concerns
regarding regulatory conditions,
corruption and economic
infrastructure, Latin America’s
private sector consistently points
to crime as one of the primary
obstacles to doing business in the
region. As early as 1997, World
Bank surveys of firms around the
world found that Latin American
entrepreneurs most often cited crime
as the main factor constraining
their ability to do business. Two
decades later, businesses in Latin
America report the highest financial
costs associated with crime, and an
astounding two-thirds of the region’s
firms pay for private security.
The toll criminal violence takes
on the private sector reverberates
throughout the region’s economies
and societies. As Alejandro Gaviria
has pointed out, the increased
costs of doing business, coupled
with declining sales in contexts
of insecurity, can lead firms to
reduce investment, stifling job
creation and economic growth.
The potential outcome is a vicious
circle in a region that continues to
exhibit exceptionally high levels of
inequality as well as complex and
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worrisome dynamics of criminal
violence, especially in countries,
such as Brazil and Venezuela,
that are experiencing economic
downturns. Addressing these
challenges will require continued
research into the economic costs
and consequences of crime.
The relationship between crime
and the private sector also has
repercussions in the political
realm. As is clear from studies
of phenomena as varied as
authoritarianism, transitions to
democracy, market reforms, taxation
and public spending, the private
sector is as much a political actor
as it is an economic one. Scholars
such as Elisabeth Jean Wood and
Angelika Rettberg have shown that
active business support for peace in
civil war settings in Latin America
has helped turn the tide of some of
the region’s most violent conflicts,
but we know considerably less
about the role that Latin America’s
business community plays in the
politics of criminal violence; that
is, the formal and informal political
processes that shape its origins,
dynamics and responses.
Businesses can play a role in
providing the state with important
resources to prevent and stem
criminal violence. Lucy Conger
documented how elite segments
of the private sector in the
Mexican state of Nuevo León gave
government officials important
financial, technical and human

resources to support the creation
of the Fuerza Civil, a new police
unit designed to be more efficient
and resistant to corruption than
existing security forces. Another
example is El Salvador, where
large multinational firms have
worked with the government
to reincorporate former gang
members into the labor force by
providing them with skills training
and employment opportunities.
Methodologically rigorous and
evidence-based evaluations of these
and other similar cases may be able
to tell us more about the efficacy of
public-private sector coordination in
this realm.
Focusing solely on the
resources that business can offer
such initiatives, however, risks
overlooking a number of other
important questions regarding
the political dimensions and
implications of the relationship
between the private sector, criminal
violence and the state in Latin
America. These questions fall into
three overarching categories: statebusiness relations, business-criminal
relations, and business resistance to
criminal actors.
State-business relations
Anecdotal evidence suggests
that collaboration between the
public and private sectors can yield
positive benefits in addressing
criminal violence, but we need
more comparative research into
the scope and influence of such
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partnerships. My own research has
found that the nature of relations
between the state and business is
shaped in part by longstanding
arrangements of governance that
often predate contemporary waves
of criminal violence and reflect a
degree of overlap between political
and economic interests. The publicprivate relationship can range
from collaborative to conflictive
and includes intriguing variants
in between, each of which poses
unique opportunities and barriers
to effective coordination on issues
of criminal violence and the rule of
law. On the one hand, collaborative
relations lead to the sharing of
critical resources and, more broadly,
private sector endorsement of
state projects to stem and prevent
violence. Conflictive state-business
relations, on the other hand,
undermine similar policymaking
efforts not only by denying resources
to the state, but also by encouraging
the private sector to support
competing efforts to establish order,
options that can include extrajudicial violence and private militias.
These relationships can vary across
and even within cities—a dynamic
that underscores the importance of
subnational politics in a realm of
scholarship and policymaking that
has traditionally favored a nationallevel focus.
Business-criminal relations
We must also consider how the
nebulous border between licit and
illicit economies affects the potential
for business to partner with the state
to stem criminal violence. More
research is needed on the linkages
between business and criminal
actors, a dynamic that can vary
along a number of dimensions,
including firm size, economic sector
and place in the commodity chain.
Different types of business, in other
words, are likely to have different

types of relationships with illicit
economies and the criminal actors
that coordinate them. Some of these
relationships approximate structural
fusions that make it difficult to
disentangle licit from illicit interests.
Others resemble arms-length
relations characterized by predatory
criminal behavior toward firms,
including protection rackets and
other forms of extortion. A better
understanding of the variations
in business-criminal relations
could greatly inform the efforts of
policymakers to help businesses
address private security concerns and
enlist their aid in broader initiatives
aimed at advancing public order.
Business resistance to
criminal violence
A closer look at attempts by
businesses to resist the advances
of criminal actors could also yield
practical insights for potential
policy interventions. During my
research into protection rackets
in Latin America, for example, I
found that businesses use varied
strategies to contest “taxation” by
criminal actors. These strategies
appear to vary depending on the
degree to which firms engage in
informal economic activities. Firms
in the state-regulated formal sector
are able to use their access to legal
sources of capital and state actors
to reject the advances of protection
rackets and engage in public forms
of resistance aimed at ending such
practices. In contrast, informal firms
whose activities are unregulated by
the state and that lack legal access to
capital often depend on protection
rackets for financial support through
short-term, high-interest loans. In
other words, formal sector firms
can count on the political and
economic resources to resist criminal
actors, while informal firms have a
substantially lower capacity to do
so. This suggests that policymakers

should consider initiatives to
improve the financial situation and
boost the political involvement of
Latin America’s substantial informal
sector as a critical part of their
efforts to stem the power of criminal
groups. Attention to the criminal
victimization of business should
be balanced with more research on
business mobilization to contest
criminal actions.
Private sector support can play an
important role in tackling persistent
criminality and the growing power
of criminal groups in Latin America.
Enlisting the aid of the private
sector, however, is as much about
politics as it is about financial
resources, job creation and technical
knowledge. More research into the
areas touched on above could help
advance our understanding of the
complex political dimensions of the
relationship between the private
sector, the state and crime in
Latin America.
Eduardo Moncada is Assistant Professor
in the Department of Political Science
at Barnard College, Columbia University
and the author of Cities, Business,
and the Politics of Urban Violence in
Latin America (Stanford University
Press, 2016).
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New Forms of Crime and Violence
in the Americas:
Human Trafficking, Transnational Organized Crime and Migration
in Central America and Mexico
by Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera

Handprints and the Spanish word for “Liberty” mark slats of the US-Mexico border fence in Nogales, Mexico, Sunday, April 2, 2017.
RODRIGO ABD/AP Photo

T

he involvement
of transnational
organized crime
in the trafficking
of undocumented
migrants in transit from Central
America to the United States is an
important hemispheric problem
that has not been well understood
or studied appropriately to date.
Many researchers and public officials
interested in this phenomenon have
relied on informants of dubious
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credibility and on informal sources
that have not been properly verified
or systematized. Migrant trafficking
is a complex human problem
that involves formal and informal
transnational actors and generates
billions of dollars in profits. The
massacre of 72 migrants in San
Fernando, Tamaulipas in 2010,
and recently documented cases of
sex and labor trafficking (including
forced labor in criminal activities)
allegedly involving transnational

criminal organizations reveal the
extent of the problem, expose
serious limitations on the part of
justice systems, and indicate the
need for further research and action.
In the Western Hemisphere, the
overlap between migration and
organized crime is most visible in
the northern triangle countries
of Central America (Honduras,
El Salvador and Guatemala) and
along Mexico’s eastern migration
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routes from the main border cities
in Tabasco and Chiapas (e.g.,
Tapachula and Tenosique) to the
border of Tamaulipas with Texas.
The most common and extensive
human trafficking activities in the
northern triangle countries are
forced prostitution and compulsory
labor for criminal gangs, especially
Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha
(MS-13). These gangs operate
transnationally, but their levels of
organization and the threat they
represent are much less significant
outside of Central America, and
they do not seem to participate in
migrant smuggling activities on a
large scale within Mexican territory.
Three central Mexican states
(State of Mexico, Tlaxcala and
Puebla), the southern state of
Chiapas, and Mexico City report
the highest incidences of human
trafficking. These types of crimes
have increased exponentially in the
past seven years-more than 600%,
according to statistics from the
Attorney General’s Office (PGR)and are concentrated mainly along
the country’s borders. In the south,
the largest forced prostitution node
is the city of Tapachula, Chiapas.
The majority of the victims are
minors, mostly poor migrant
girls from Guatemala, Honduras
and El Salvador. The state of
Chiapas’s special prosecutor’s office
investigated 68 cases of human
trafficking from 2008 through May
31, 2015, most of them involving
sex trafficking. Despite these
investigations, NGOs and human
rights defenders report serious
limitations in the justice system and
law enforcement, mainly at the state
and local levels. All too often, they
claim, undocumented migrants in
vulnerable situations and victims
of labor exploitation are the ones
arrested and charged, not the actual
traffickers. These allegations can

be verified by examining prison
files and the testimony of detainees
who have been presumed guilty in
advance of any due process.
A second common form of
migrant trafficking along Mexico’s
eastern migration routes is forced
labor for criminal activities.
Typically, transnational criminal
organizations, mostly drug cartels,
compel hapless migrants to engage
in activities such as the production,
transport and sale of illicit
drugs; violence or killing for hire
(sicariato); and surveillance for their
organizations (halconaje). Other
aspects of the problem include
migrant smuggling and kidnappings
for ransom. The main groups
involved in these activities in eastern
Mexico include Los Zetas, the Gulf
Cartel and, more recently, the Jalisco
New Generation Cartel (Cartel
Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG)
in Veracruz. Most of the victims are
young Central American men and
Mexican deportees, recruited
mainly in Mexico’s northeastern
border region.
The practice of compelling
migrants to work for criminal
organizations was especially
prevalent during the most violent
period of Mexico’s drug war, from
2010 through early 2013. During
this period, the cartels forced many
migrants to commit acts of violence
and even murder. The areas most
affected included the southern
border city of Tenosique, Tabasco;
Saltillo, Torreón and Piedras
Negras, Coahuila; the main cities of
Veracruz (including Coatzacoalcos,
the city of Veracruz and Boca
del Río); and the entire state of
Tamaulipas. Today, forced labor for
criminal activities in Mexico takes
place mainly in the Tamaulipas
border cities of Reynosa, Matamoros
and Nuevo Laredo; the Tamaulipas

state capital, Ciudad Victoria;
Piedras Negras, Coahuila; and the
state of Veracruz. All suffer from
rampant corruption and deficient
law enforcement, with numerous
allegations of close links between
local and state law enforcement
agencies and organized crime.
The current security crisis in
Mexico and Central America, a
weak rule of law, high levels of
corruption, and the limitations
of Mexican legislation make the
problem of migrant trafficking
in the region even more acute.
At its root are the massive forced
displacements of Central Americans
escaping violence and extreme
poverty in their countries. Sex and
labor trafficking, with the alleged
involvement of transnational
criminal organizations, is intimately
linked to migrant smuggling.
All of the manifestations of this
problem underscore the limits of
the region’s justice systems and the
need for further research to help us
understand these connections.
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera is Associate
Professor of Public Affairs and Security
Studies at the University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley (UTRGV). The information
for this piece comes from a project that
was funded through a research grant from
the United States Department of State
Trafficking in Persons Office (J/TIP)
and should not be reproduced or copied
without permission. The contents are the
responsibility of the researcher and do
not necessarily reflect the views of
the Department of State or the
United States government.
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On the Difficulties of Representation:

Women in Gangs in
Latin America
by María Santacruz Giralt

Female inmates attend a mass marking one hundred days since a peace agreement was reached among gang members at the women’s prison of Ilopango
in San Salvador, El Salvador, Tuesday, June 26, 2012. LUIS ROMERO/AP Photo
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I

n the late nineteenth
century, the field of
criminology paid little
attention to offenses
committed by women. If the
topic was considered at all, it was
marginalized, pathologized and
(hetero) sexualized. Male scientists
and, later, criminologists and
doctors, largely defined women
by contrasting their “dangerous,
disruptive subjectivities” with
the “rational and reliable” male
mind. As a result, many scientific
disciplines, including psychiatry
and criminology, became important
drivers in the production of a
normative femininity as the context
for explaining female crime.
For years, the incursion of
girls and women into “outlaw
spaces” was explained as the
manifestation of individual
maladjustments, psychiatric
disorders or moral deviations.
Well into the twentieth century,
girls and women who strayed from
the law and, with it, the standard
of the “feminine-normative woman”
occupied a unique place in the
taxonomy of deviation. Even today,
women are automatically thought
of as the victims of or bystanders to
violence, not as its agents. It comes
as a shock to imagine a female
taking a life rather than creating
and nurturing it.
Given the persistence of such
assumptions, criminal transgression
is still widely understood as an
eminently masculine phenomenon.
An example is the issue of female
involvement in gangs in Latin
America, especially in El Salvador,
where these criminal organizations
are a major social problem.
Research on the roles girls and
women play in gangs is a neglected
topic, or at least a marginal one
in comparison with the work

that has been done on male gang
members. Three related issues
are responsible for this neglect:
first, the development and
complexity of the gang
phenomenon in Central America;
second, traditional approaches to
transgression and violence; and
third, women’s minority status
within gangs themselves.
Research on gangs has struggled
to keep up with the rapid changes
this phenomenon has experienced
in the past decade, including the
growing links between organized
crime and delinquency, the impact
of state policies and, most recently,
ties and negotiations with state
agents. The bulk of study has
targeted the main actors in these
spaces (the “homeboys”), with
women’s involvement ranking as
an incidental or, at best, secondary
concern. This paucity of inquiry
about women’s agency is explained
not only by the gender gap (the
lower female delinquency rate
compared to men), but also,
and more importantly, by the
way society represents women.
As many contemporary
female authors have observed,
much of the research on women
as violent actors follows an agenda
shaped by traditional, universalist,
reductionist and/or sexualized
representations of “women.”
This is an agenda that conceives
of women as the objects (sufferers,
victims) or witnesses (spectators,
scholars) of violence, not its subjects
(perpetrators, agents). The issue
of women in gangs is a complex
and sensitive subject because
women’s regime of action is
complex. Their transgressions
are not only criminal but also
social, because they disrupt the
conventional link between women
and violence.

Women have minority status
within gangs, not only in terms
of numbers but also because of a
qualitative imbalance. Salvadoran
gang dynamics, representations
and group practices engender and
are produced by the implicit and
explicit codes, values and rules
of a violent masculinity. Gangs
are spaces configured by practices
linked to the cultural meanings
by which members represent
themselves collectively, construct
their subjectivities and understand
the “world of the masculine” on
close terms with violence. Gangs
are spaces that reproduce at a
micro-level, in an extreme way,
representations, stereotypes and
asymmetries prevalent in
Salvadoran society. In those worlds,
the center of daily life is marked by
excessive violence.
Women constitute a collective
subject in a larger dynamic centered
on the active exercise of a violent
masculinity that requires them to
join in as “one of the guys,” but at
the same time they are conditioned
by their “womanhood” inside and
outside of the gang. Much of the
trouble in analyzing this dynamic
stems from the difficulty of focusing
on the complex agency of a
particular type of research subject/
object. In other words, violent
acts on the part of women within
criminal gangs break the logic of
society’s ascribed role for women.
María Santacruz Giralt is a Salvadoran
sociologist. She is an instructor at the
Universidad Centroamericana in
San Salvador.
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“A Good Criminal is a Dead
Criminal”: Police Killings in Brazil
by Ignacio Cano

B

razil, along with Jamaica
and, more recently,
some Central American
countries, is one of
the places in the world
where the police are most known
for using lethal force. According to
official data released by the Forum
Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, a
total of 3,022 people lost their lives
as a result of police interventions
in 2014. This figure, necessarily
an underestimation of the real
phenomenon, is already equal to
a rate of 1.5 police killings per
100,000 inhabitants, higher than
the overall homicide rate in many
other countries. It also marked a
37% increase from the previous
year. The national rate hides stark
regional differences, with states
such as Rio de Janeiro, Alagoas and
São Paulo facing a far more acute
problem. Brazilian police officers in
turn are subject to disproportionate
violence: 398 of them were killed
in 2014, most of them in the same
states mentioned above. The main
difference is that while officers kill
most suspects while on duty, the
majority of law enforcement agents
are killed off duty as a result of
private conflicts, while resisting a
robbery, or simply because they are
recognized as police officers.
The profile of a victim of police
killings is the same as that of the
typical homicide victim: a young
black male who lives on the urban
periphery. Research in Rio de
Janeiro shows that the probability
of being killed (as opposed to
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being wounded) in a shootout with
the police is approximately 8%
higher if the suspect is black. This
discrepancy holds true both inside
and outside the favelas (slums).
Police killings in Brazil, in contrast
to those in the US, are more often
debated along the lines of class or
territory rather than race.
Beyond the high incidence
of police violence, the pressing
question is whether the use of
such force is justified or excessive.
Given the notorious inability of the
Brazilian criminal justice system
to investigate police killings and
separate legitimate from abusive
police actions, analysts often resort
to global indices of police use of
force. The most common ones are
the lethality index (the number of
dead suspects divided by wounded
suspects); the ratio of suspects killed
to law enforcement officers killed;
and the proportion of all homicides
that result from police action.
Regardless of the index used, the
figures reveal the excessive use of
force and the practice of summary
executions in several Brazilian states,
confirming the conclusions of many
human rights reports.
The roots of this excess in the use
of lethal force are manifold. The
first obvious one is the existence of
particularly violent types of criminal
behavior. In Rio de Janeiro, for
example, drug-dealing gangs control
the slums with assault rifles and
dispute their territories with each
other and the police.

The second factor is the prevalence
of a “warrior ethos” among police
officers, who see their mission as
a war against crime rather than
protecting the civilian population,
to the point that innocent victims
of the crossfire are viewed as
collateral damage.
Third, significant sectors of
the population support punitive
policing out of a belief that violence
is the only way to fight crime given
the weakness of Brazil’s criminal
justice system. A survey of the
general population in 2010 revealed
that 44% of Brazilians agreed
that “a good criminal is a dead
criminal.” Recent research shows
that many people support summary
executions even though they do not
trust the police or their capacity to
distinguish between criminals and
law-abiding citizens, as revealed by
several notorious cases of “police
mistakes” that resulted in deaths.
Fourth, Brazil lacks proper
internal and external controls
on police use of force. The Civil
Police (which plays an investigative
role), the Public Prosecutor’s
Office and the Judiciary have all
neglected their duty to investigate
cases of police killings and punish
abuses. In an already overburdened
criminal justice system, little
attention is spared for murders
where evidence is scarce, witnesses
are terrified, and prosecution
of law enforcement agents is
unpopular among broad sectors
of the population. Indeed, legal
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People reenact a killing during an August 22, 2014 march through the Manguinhos favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to protest police killings of blacks.
Every year, Brazil ’s police are responsible for around 2,000 deaths, one of the highest rates in the world. Many of the deaths in Rio involve blacks killed
in favelas. MARIO TAMA/Getty Images

transference of the responsibility for
killings committed by the military
police from the military courts to
civilian jurisdiction in 1997 did
not translate into a significantly
higher number of prosecutions or
sentences against police officers
involved in summary executions.
Internal controls also tend to be lax
and not focused on the use of force.
Until recently, the military police in
Rio, for example, could not account
for the number of bullets shot by
each officer, even though the figure
reached the hundreds in some cases.
The military police in São Paulo in
the 1990s and in Rio more recently
introduced internal programs to
monitor the use of force, but results
have been limited.

Poor police training and the
lack of a clear official policy are
additional factors that explain
the use of excessive force. Some
officers are uncertain when and how
to use force: Many genuinely believe
they could be prosecuted just for
trying to defend themselves, whereas
others think it is legal to shoot a
fleeing suspect. In addition, the
availability of non-lethal weapons
is not guaranteed.
Finally, police officers lead a
stressful life and are commonly
exposed to violence, to which
they tend to respond with more
violence. Recent research in
Rio suggests that factors such as
witnessing other colleagues being

shot, or experiencing violence in
adolescence, are associated
with the increased use of force,
as are institutional incentives to
interdict drugs.
Once all of these factors are added
up, perhaps the real question is why
the number of civilians and police
officers who murder each other in
Brazil every year isn’t higher.
Ignacio Cano is a Spanish sociologist.
He is the coordinator of the Laboratory for
the Analysis of Violence (LAV) at the State
University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ).
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“We Are Marked by Its Signs”:
The Pull of Gang Life in
Central America

I

n 2016, the Kimberly
Green Latin American
and Caribbean Center, in
partnership with Florida
International University’s
Jack Gordon Institute for Public
Policy and El Salvador’s Fundación
Nacional para el Desarrollo, carried
out a research project to understand
the phenomenon of gangs in that
Central American country, home to
some of the most violent criminal
organizations in the region. The
research team conducted interviews
with more than 1,200 active and
former gang members (pandilleros)
in jails, prisons, rehab programs
and juvenile correction centers.
These conversations, excerpts of
which appear below, shed light on
such topics as the context of gang
violence in El Salvador; what kind of
people tend to be recruited and why;
and how feasible it is for members
to leave gang life, as well as the role
society can play in facilitating this
decision. More information about
the research, the sponsor institution,
and the ethical procedures followed
to protect interview respondents
are available at https://lacc.fiu.edu/
research/the-new-face-of-streetgangs-in-central-america/.
Interviewer: Why do young people
join gangs in El Salvador?
Pandillero 2:
First of all, the unemployment.
Lack of opportunities. The situation
in the country is really bad. For
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example, I was not involved in
anything wrong before… But
they [the police] see you talking
to the guys [the gang] and harass
you, think that you are with
them. And you react by deciding
to join the gang. You feel anger. I
remember once a boy was killed in
my neighborhood; I wasn’t a gang
member yet, but I felt anger at how
he was murdered. And that is what
motivated me to become a member.
Obviously, it isn’t good what they
do, but violence generates more
violence. Here, if you kill one gang
member, three new ones join. Gangs
are not good but they gain power by
recruiting young people. Remember,
gangs are considered to be cool/
fashionable. The gang attracts
members because it is popular. The
more the police put the pressure on,
the more angry people get.

the police, you are a gang member.
It’s just that simple: There is always
someone in your family or among
your friends with links to the gangs.

Pandillero 13:
In my case, I liked the gangs. Ever
since I was young, I liked their
tattoos, their music; I liked to see
how girls approached them [gang
members]… like they were popular.
However, in many cases, people
don’t join gangs voluntarily, but
because they are forced to. Often
people join to defend someone else
or themselves, or their family...
Your brother or sister may have
had problems with some gang, and
so you join another one to protect
them. You could say that here in El
Salvador, if you are not a member of

Interviewer: Describe “respect.”
Pandillero 7:
If I’m in the gang, nobody will argue
with me; nobody will be able to
harm me. If they touch me, they’re
gonna have problems. Basically, it’s
based on fear.

Pandillero 15:
[People join the gang] because they
often do not have any options. They
view it as something natural. Young
people want to feel important,
to feel accepted, to be part of
something. In this sense, gangs are
often more receptive toward young
people. They attract them, tempt
them. They are better at this than
many other organizations.
Pandillero 7:
Many young people become
involved with gangs because of
a lack of love from their parents.
Some get involved because they
want more respect.

Interviewer: Do you think the
gangs have a clear goal? If so, what
is their goal?
Pandillero 12:
The main goal of the gang is to
dominate a territory. To control it.
Remember, many gang members
have a lot of resentment. They
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have been humiliated, and so their
purpose is to dominate in some
form. What they want is power.
Interviewer: What kind of power do
gang members want? Economic, social
or political?
Pandillero 12:
I would say both economic
and social. Young people often
rebel during adolescence. They
seek attention. But this type of
rebellion is different: It is caused
by emptiness. It reflects a lack
of appreciation and love. [Gang
members] aren’t violent without a
reason; the vacuum in their lives
manifests itself through violence.
Regarding economic power, gang
members just want to come out of
poverty. Poverty is the main reason.
One of my friends used to tell me:
‘let’s jump in [join the gang], we are
gonna have money, we are gonna
have what our parents don’t give us.’
Interviewer: Did you find these
things in the gang?
Pandillero 12:
No. I partly found respect, social
recognition, but not always. In
terms of economic power, I didn’t
get what I expected.
Interviewer: What did the gang give
you, then?
Pandillero 12:
You could say power. In the sense
that if someone looked at me the
wrong way, because I was with the
gang I could take him out. I even
got a weapon. A homemade one,
but still—I felt powerful with it. I
knew that I could intimidate anyone
who crossed me.
Interviewer: What is it that attracts
young people most to gangs vs. other
social organizations?
Pandillero 15:
It can be many things, but mostly,
young people are attracted by the

possibility of finding an identity.
Teenagers often lack identity; the
gang gives it to them, to the point
that it even gives them new names.
Interviewer: What is the main
purpose of the gangs?
Pandillero 15:
At some point, the gangs did not
have a purpose. Before, they might
have served as a tool for self-defense
or a secure place. Over time, they
have acquired a purpose. Nowadays,
the main goal of gangs is economic,
to get revenue. A sense of identity,
of being notorious, may be there,
too, but it’s not the main purpose.
Pandillero 16:
To recruit more members, especially
young ones. They look for kids
who are, like, 8 years old… In my
neighborhood, for example, there
are 5- or 6-year-old kids who are
already beginning…and it’s a pity
because they may already carry a
pistol. You can see an 8-year-old
firing a pistol. The gang sees they
are kids and takes advantage of their
innocence. They are not looking for
adults, just youngsters.
Pandillero 2: There is an order. The
gang always has an objective: to
control, to gain territory, so that all
of El Salvador belongs to one gang.
That is when the homicides will
stop. Controlling a territory allows
them to develop criminal activities
calmly, to extort…
Interviewer: Can [the gang] problem
be solved in the next 10 years?
Pandillero 2:
It is hard. There is no solution.
The only solution should address
the roots of the problem. I do not
think the gangs will disappear. They
are becoming stronger, gaining
more power. Inside the prison,
the situation is really bad. The
government mistreats the inmates.

So many people want to change,
but they have no opportunities. I
spent 10 months in prison and the
situation is critical. In the state of
emergency now we have no water…
we could spend 20 days without
water…the food is often inedible.
This is repression. And the more
repression the gangs feel, the more
anger and hatred it creates.
Pandillero 18:
We need preventive programs
against violence that would provide
young people with recreational
activities. We need to take young
people into account, teach them
and give them ways to occupy their
free time, because that’s precisely
when gangs target them most. Of
course, I don’t think they should
be given anything they want, but
they also have rights under the law.
If someone is beaten they will react
differently. We all have opportunities
to change, but if the violence comes
from the government, the response
from youth will be worse. Look at
the prisons: There are sick inmates
there who need help. But instead,
they are kept isolated… If the law
changed a little bit, it could reduce
the levels of violence.
Interviewer: What conditions are
necessary for a gang member to leave
a gang?
Pandillero 13:
There is no such thing as leaving
the gang. You may not have
noticed, but I have tattoos on
my body. We are not there anymore
but, in a certain way, the group
considers us to still be a part of it
because we are marked by its
signs. You can “calm down” [no
longer participate in gang life
and the activities of the gang
organization], but not leave the
gang. Nobody can leave the gang.
The only way to find light is
through God.
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Alleged members of the 18th Street Gang are presented to the press in San Salvador, El Salvador on February 26, 2016. Over the course of three days, members of
the national civil police and the armed forces captured 240 gang members accused of homicide and extortion. MARVIN RECINOS/AFP/Getty Images

Pandillero 11:
Spiritual change. Only God can
change a person… To calm down,
you have to have been in a gang
for a while; that is, if a member has
done enough for the gang and has a
good rank, he can get a pass to calm
down. Otherwise, it’s a lie, unless
you become a Christian. Calming
down is still like being active. I’ve
40

known people who calmed down
at first and then were active again
because they don’t have God in
their heart.
Pandillero 15:
Actually, the gangs make you swear
an oath of loyalty until death. There
have been cases of people who
calm down; they walk away from

the gang for various reasons, such
as having a family. They stop their
illicit activities, sometimes they
move…but these are very isolated
cases. The possibility is stronger if a
young gang member finds a new ID,
a new lifestyle, a 360° turn in life,
something that changes him. But
he can’t keep on committing crimes
outside the gang; this would cause

Hemisphere Volume 26

16224_SIPA_LACC-Hemisphere Mag 2017.indd 40

7/25/17 12:47 PM

Interview

discontent in the gang. So, if he says
he will change his life, the change
must be radical, otherwise the gang
won’t accept it.
Interviewer: On a personal level, what
does someone need to leave the gang?
Pandillero 6:
They need to have a way to occupy

their time and know that their life is
worth something. In the gang, you
fall into a life of vice, alcohol, drugs,
violence…You basically waste your
life. You don’t value it. Some people
even kill themselves because their
conscience won’t leave them alone.
My conscience was chasing me, and
that’s why I started drinking a lot.
…Many people can’t live with what
they have done. Gang members
know that what they are doing is
wrong. I left because I was told
the gang [a rival gang] went to my
house to shoot it up. I knew that
I’d be killed someday. My mom was
selling pupusas outside our house
with my brother and sister. A car
stopped and the people in the car
started to fire at them. My sister
was injured, and my mother and
my brother were shot as well. And
an 8-year-old kid, who was just
eating pupusas, died right there…
My friends came and told that they
had come to my place, harmed my
family, and that we were going to
avenge ourselves. I said to God:
just give me one more chance.
And I told myself from my heart:
If I go [looking for revenge], first,
they could kill me….Second, the
police could catch me and I could
be incarcerated for 30 years…And
third, even worse, they could come
back and kill someone in my family.
They had already injured them….
So, I told my brother: if you want
to, go ahead. I’m done; I’m not
going anywhere. And my brother
told me, “then I’m done, too. I’m
here [in the gang] only because of
you, to protect you.”
Interviewer: What are the challenges
people face once they leave the gang?
Pandillero 23:
Your family is the major challenge,
because your family knows you best.
I did not grow up with my mother.
She just left me in the neighborhood
and went away. After my brother

was murdered, she told me that I
was dead to her, too, and that I was
never going to change. It’s a huge
challenge when your own mom,
who had you, who is supposed to
love you unconditionally, tells you
this kind of thing. In my case, I can’t
say that I love her. She was never
there for me; I’ve never known her
love. And this was a major obstacle
—that after all I had lost, when I
really wanted to recover and change,
she reacted like this. I felt that it
made things worse…
Pandillero 8:
The main problem is nonacceptance. Because in the eyes
of society, a gang member never
changes. We feel excluded and it’s
really bad, because some of us have
families, kids, we want to work...
Sometimes, job positions require
a high school degree. (In my case,
thank God, I have a high school
degree). Or you can be rejected
because of a tattoo or because of
your past. Tattoos are art in other
places. Here, tattoos are associated
with gang members.
Pandillero 13:
The discrimination. Even though
I’m a Christian now, the police keep
pursuing me anyway. The police
play a big role in the fact that many
people who want to change cannot.
People who want to leave the gang
need a helping hand; they need
someone to help them. But this
hand does not exist.
Compiled by José Miguel Cruz,
a political scientist and director of
research at the Kimberly Green Latin
American and Caribbean Center at
Florida International University.
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Everlasting
by Donna DeCesare

Moravia barrio,
Medellín, Colombia, 2001
Like most of Medellín᾽s barrios,
this one is controlled by gangs.
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2001

Medellín,
Colombia, 2001
The funeral for a youth from the “comunas”who was
murdered in clashes between
gangs and armed groups over control of
profits from extorting the bus routes.
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2001
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El Carmen de Bolívar,
Colombia, 2005
Survivors of the El Salado Massacre, these orphaned children are
now displaced and living in El Carmen. They receive support from
“Women Life and Future,” an NGO that helps victims of the conflict.
Since the paramilitary groups who perpetrated the massacre demobilized,
the killers have immunity and have been living in the same region as their
former victims.
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2005
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Villavicencio,
Colombia, 2007
Mariela Duarte, widow of human
rights lawyer Josue Giraldo, is raising
her two daughters alone. Mariela
lives a very private life but wants the
memory of her murdered husband
to be honored. “Josue was a generous
person who always helped others. He
was transparent in everything he did
and deserves transparency about his
life and the way he died.”
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2007

Guatemala City,
Guatemala, 2001
A crowd gathers at a
crime scene following a
gang-related homicide.
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2001
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Guatemala City,
Guatemala, 2005
At the Verbena cemetery, a youth
weeps inconsolably for an older
boy who had been like a father to
him. The murdered youth had been
involved with gangs but recently
became an evangelical Christian and
supported himself by selling candy
on the buses downtown. He was
murdered in broad daylight in
Zone 1 in what some allege was
a revenge gang killing based on
mistaken identity.
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2005

Guatemala City,
Guatemala, 2001
Cindy, a 16-year-old prostitute,
struggles to earn money to support
her two-year-old son. She hopes to
leave this life and fears having her
face shown. Many of the women in
this gang-controlled red light district
are trafficked from other Central
American countries.
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2001
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Guatemala City,
Guatemala, 2001
Rosario (an alias for her protection)
is now 19 years old. She was raped
by Guatemalan policemen when
she was 15. After she received death
threats for speaking out, Casa
Alianza provided her refuge and
began a legal case to prosecute the
men who victimized her.
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2001

Guatemala City,
Guatemala, 2005
Elcira González Pérez, 41, pictured
with her daughter, Dalia Susena
Alvarado González 15, holds a
portrait and the 6th-grade diploma
of her daughter, Fabiola Alvarado
González, who died of HIV-related
illness in 1999 at age 12.
Elcira González became an HIV
and women’s rights activists when
she discovered that her 9-year-old
daughter had been sexually abused
by her husband (the child's own
father) and that he had been offering
her to his friends for money. She
fought to have her ex-husband
and all of the men who raped her
daughter incarcerated. The case
received widespread press coverage,
but instead of gaining her sympathy
the publicity caused the family to
suffer tremendous stigma. Schools
rejected her daughter, neighbors
taunted them and they were forced
to move many times. Despite
the stigma, Elcira and Dalia
continue their work as activists.
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2001
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Bogotá,
Colombia, 2001
Therapist Monica Berjano
counsels an adolescent incest victim.
The children use doll figures to aid
in talking about traumatic events
and strengthen their self-esteem.
Renacer is an NGO that provides
therapy for children who have been
sexually abused.
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2001

Guatemala City,
Guatemala, 2003
Guatemalan Police routinely search
and detain gang members. Critics
complain that the police engage
in extra-judicial killings of youth
suspected of belonging to gangs.
Copyright ©
Donna DeCesare, 2003
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Photo Essay

Medellín, Colombia, 2001
The barrios of Medellín are full of armed actors. Gangs often control territory, but guerrillas and paramilitary
groups also contest power. The availability of handguns as well as assault rifles and the lack of state presence
ensures domination by the armed groups. Even though they participate in criminal actions, people sometimes
prefer the homegrown gangs because their members at least come from the community and hence have a greater
sense of connection to people who live in their barrio than those who come from outside to take control.
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2001

San Salvador, El Salvador, 2009
At a leadership training workshop on gender rights, a group of young women from one of the most impoverished
and violent barrios lists suggestions for how to reduce violence in Salvadoran society.
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2009
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